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GIVING ORDERS IN RURAL SOUTHERN RHODESIA: 
CONTROVERSIES OVER AFRICANS' AUTHORITY IN 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, 1928-1934* 
By Carol Summers 
In Southern Rhodesia during the 1920s and 1930s, government officials, 
missionaries, and educated Africans saw African communities in crisis. 
Individualism threatened communal identities. Customs and values were mutating 
under economic, social, and political pressure from an increasingly segregationist 
settler-dominated state. In this context, policymakers held two potentially 
contradictory values: order and progressive change. And they saw schools and their 
surrounding communities as the most important potential sources of ordered 
change. The Jeanes program, imported from the United States in the wake of the 
Phelps-Stokes Commission, was the single most prominent effort to reconcile order 
and change, communal values and ambitious individualism. 
This article focuses on the period from 1928 to 1935, Depression years, when 
Harold Jowitt was director of native development. During these years, debates over 
the Jeanes teacher program, and specifically over the careers of Matthew 
Magorimbo and Lysias Mukahleyi, exposed both the needs that drew the 
administration and missions toward community-based development, and the 
questions of power, authority, and resources that blocked community development, 
and more specifically the Jeanes teacher program, from achieving its stated aims. 
Native Development Politics 
In 1928, Harold Jowitt inherited a troubled program. Many within the 
administration of Southern Rhodesia had some concept of native development, but 
the bureaucratic structure of development programs was confusing, chaotic, and 
conflict-provoking. An ambitious and articulate specialist in African education and 
development, Jowitt's first task as director of native education was to expand the 
scope of his department. He rewrote the Native Education Act of 1928 into a far 
more sweeping Native Development Act of 1929 and hired a staff of government 
native school inspectors. Native development, he argued, was based on education 
but extended far beyond the classroom. Jowitt's Native Development Act defined 
the department's cope as "the education of Natives and any other work primarily 
designed to further the agricultural, industrial, physical or social advancement of 
Natives."1 
* The earliest version of this article was presented at the African Studies Association meeting 
in Orlando, Florida, in 1995. The article draws on research supported by a National Academy of 
Education (Spencer Foundation) postdoctoral fellowship and by faculty research grants from the 
University of Richmond. 
1 Report of the Director of Native Development for 1929 (Salisbury, 1930), 1. 
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Jowitt's broad definition of native development, and his ambitious attempts to 
pursue it, outstripped his new department's limited funding. By the end of his first 
year, he was campaigning for more resources. The department's inspectors could 
not visit all schools. The missions could not intensify their efforts without higher 
government grants. And teachers needed increased and standardized salaries if 
missions were to promote teacher effectiveness and attract and retain teachers with 
higher qualifications.2 Jowitt quickly realized, however, like others before him, 
that the administration was not willing to provide more money for African education 
and development.3 He therefore attempted to pair economy with expansion by 
recruiting allies for his visions from outside the administration and settler elite: he 
attempted to produce regulations that would transform missionaries and the mission 
school system into a more effective tool of government; he sought to upgrade the 
education of African teachers to make classrooms more effective, disciplined, and 
regulated; and he reached out to the international educational development 
community to seek external models and sponsors for development on the cheap. 
The Jeanes Teacher program, one of the most focused attempts at community 
development, brought hese three sources of extragovernmental support together. It 
was modelled on a program that trained visiting teachers for black schools in the 
American South. Southern Rhodesian candidates were educated Christians, ideally 
with some teaching experience, nominated by their missions, and admitted to 
training. Jeanes programs sought to give African men and women advanced 
training in the basic skills of community development: hygiene, school 
improvement, industrial skills, medical aid, and domesticity. After a course at 
Domboshawa School and a community-based internship, the men would go back to 
the missions that sponsored them. Working under a missionary supervisor, each 
man would have responsibility for a circle of rural schools. He was required to visit 
the schools, help teachers improve their techniques, sponsor school garden plots, 
and direct the students in manual and industrial work. But he was to do more, 
reaching out from school to community: helping with cleanups, overseeing latrine 
digs, and providing suggestions for cooperative organizations ranging from the 
schools' parent committees through communal work parties. The male Jeanes 
teacher would be working with denominational schools, and reporting to a mission 
supervisor. But he would be paid by the Native Development Department at a 
substantially higher level than a regular mission-employed teacher.4 Jeanes women, 
2 Report of the Director of Native Education for 1928 (Salisbury 1929), 8. 
3 Unlike the Native Department's spending, which could be characterized as essential to law, 
order, and tax collection, education and development were discretionary expenses without strong 
white constituencies. 
4 The mission salaries for certificated teachers ranged as low as ?2 per month for nine or ten 
months of the year. Chibi Mission, DRC, See correspondence of George Mhlanga and Ndambi 
Hliziyo to A.R. Mather, National Archives of Zimbabwe [hereafter NAZ] S2307/2. Jeanes 
teachers, however, were paid a probationary salary of ?60 per year for the first year, and offered at 
least the theoretical possibility of increasing, in steps of ?3 per year of experience, with three 
grades based on merit, to a ceiling of ?120 per year. They also received bicycle allowances of 
7s/6d. per month and at least the possibility of a future pension. Colonial Secretary to DND, 17-7- 
30, NAZ S 170/1225. 
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nominated by mission superiors, and then trained at Hope Fountain, filled a slightly 
different role. Their curriculum skipped training in teacher supervision. And they 
were not tied to specific schools. Instead, they were encouraged to live with their 
families, transform their homes into models of domesticity, and reach out from that 
home base through demonstrations of domestic hygiene, cookery, and sewing, and 
through providing health services ranging from dispensing through wound- 
dressing to midwifery. Jeanes women were also supervised by missionaries but 
paid by the Native Development Department.5 
Ideally, the Jeanes program was supposed to be catalytic and participatory as 
the teachers used schools and reformed and cleaned up homes to spark off a 
revolution of progressive development by African observers who saw, believed, 
and copied the teachers' initiatives. Impressed by this vision, missions sent some of 
their most promising young men and women, the Carnegie Corporation provided 
external aid money, and the department developed the new training programs at 
Domboshawa and Hope Fountain. 
The program provoked controversies within the administration, however. Even 
before Jowitt's Jeanes program, the Native Departnent had fought against the 
Native Development Department for control over the training and stationing of all 
Africans involved in development work, such as agricultural demonstrators. Under 
Native Department pressure, as the first agricultural demonstrators at Domboshawa 
completed what they had expected would be a two-year training program, their 
supervisor, E.D. Alvord, declared them woefully underprepared for the tasks ahead 
and proposed a third year of apprenticeship near the school with close oversight.6 
Following Native Department ideas despite his own background at the American 
Board mission, Alvord continued the pattern of condemning mission training, 
standards, and achievements with scathing commentary suggesting that mission 
schooling was not up to standard either academically or agriculturally.7 The 
discussions and disagreements over the agricultural demonstration program were 
resolved, uneasily, by a bureaucratic rearrangement that accepted the Native 
Department's hegemony: Alvord, and all his demonstrators were placed in the 
Native Department, under the command of the chief native commissioner (CNC), 
and, in various localities, under the relevant native commissioner. Alvord followed 
an aggressive program of oversight, holding before- and after-harvest meetings 
with each demonstrator and monitoring plowing, planting, and land management. 
The training program for Jeanes teachers began in 1929 in this context of 
controversy over the training and control of African agents. Even more than the 
agricultural demonstration program, Jowitt tailored the Jeanes program to his own 
notions of how the government, missions, and progressive Africans could work 
S The government established three grades of pay for female Jeanes teachers, ranging from a 
low of ?15 per year for beginning teachers to a high of ?48 per year for top-ranked, experienced, 
Jeanes women. It is not clear, however, whether anyone ever actually received the top salary 
allowed before the program was ended. Public Services Board to Colonial Secretary, 11-8-30, NAZ 
S 170/1124. 
6 NAZ S138/69, Acting CNC to Treasury, 19-8-26. 
7 NAZ S 138/69, Alvord to CNC on training of demonstrators at Domboshawa, 10-10-27. 
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together for development. Jowitt was blunt in pointing out that he had written the 
grant proposal that funded the program and that the missions had sent on their best 
people with the assurance that these people would be returned to them. 
Some early, glowing, reports provide glimpses of the types of community 
improvement he program was designed to produce. John Marsh, the supervisor of 
the American Board's Chikore mission circuit, reported that "this venture is one of 
the most significant single steps in the progress of Native education in Rhodesia."8 
Other supervisors agreed, providing specific examples to back this claim. Titus 
Mngadi, a London Missionary Society (or LMS) Jeanes Teacher working in the 
Hope Fountain district, had organized materials and supervised the construction of 
a dispensary to be run by the local Jeanes woman.9 Jeanes Teacher Zhakata, 
working in the Selukwe Reserve, ran monthly teachers' meetings with 
demonstration lessons and promoted the establishment of school gardens carefully 
fertilized by manure.10 Mac Sitole pushed teachers to institute "hand work" lessons 
in the schools and managed a circuit of schools without European oversight while 
his missionary supervisor went on furlough for three months.11 Jeanes teacher 
Ndebele worked to improve roads and establish vegetable gardens for each school. 
He also met with parents and headmen and, like his colleagues, gave demonstration 
lessons to teachers, providing academic and pedagogical suggestions of how to 
understand and teach the newly revised curriculum.12 For their missionary 
supervisors, Jeanes teachers' most impressive achievements were the large 
community meetings they called, at which they lectured on "the aims and objects of 
the school and the necessity of the children having proper equipment and being 
clean always." 13 
Mission supervisors were impressed by Jeanes teachers' ability to involve the 
larger community with the school and the school with the larger community. Jeanes 
teachers sponsored parental involvement hrough parent committees and called for 
parents to show their support by providing manure for school gardens, helping 
with ploughing or roadbuilding, and buying school materials to equip their children 
properly. Jeanes teachers also called for students to bring the school values to the 
broader community by doing cleaning raids, where a group of students would go 
8 J. Marsh, Report Jeanes Teachers' work, Chikore Kraal schools, Jan.-June 1933, NAZ 
S 1542/J1/v.3. 
9 Report on Titus Mngadi, Jeanes Supervisor, Hope Fountain District, Jan.-June 1933, NAZ 
S1542/J1 v.3. 
10 Ibbotsen, Report on the Work of A Zhakata (JT Selukwe) July-December 1933. NAZ 
S 1542 JI v. 3. 
11 Orner, Report on the Work of Jeanes Teacher Mac Sitole, 2d half 1933, 31-12-33, NAZ 
S1542/J1 v.3. 
12 Steward, Report on J. Ndebele, 1934, NAZ S1542/JI/ v.1. 
13 HS Edwards, Report on Jeanes Teacher Timon Zinyemba, Jan.-June 1935 [Filabusi], 
NAZ 1542/Ji v.l. 
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out and clean up a "kraal," sweeping away clutter, possibly building a latrine, and 
sometimes planting trees, flowers, or vegetables.14 
Even the most muted supervisors' reports were positive, indicating the 
missionaries' hope that the Jeanes teachers would be effective in their awkward 
position as trained generalists working to bridge the gap between the more elderly 
and reactionary elements in African communities and the mission and Native 
Development Department agendas of progress. Missionaries sometimes decried the 
"indifference of parents" 15 or accepted a frustrated Jeanes teacher's conclusion that 
"his people are not going to change customs over night. He realizes that he is 
fighting the inertia prevalent among the native people-an unwillingness to do that 
which requires added effort, even though they are told that benefits may be 
derived."116 
Missionaries, though, generally praised Jeanes teachers' energy, even when 
that energy produced such serious antagonisms that the teacher had to be transferred 
to another region.17 The missions expected a Jeanes teacher, after a broad training, 
to examine the specific area he found himself in, to work out his own goals, and do 
whatever was necessary to accomplish them. By the 1930s, some missionaries 
were disgusted with the slow pace of change in African communities. Missionaries 
were limited in numbers and racially conspicuous. They thus found themselves at 
least on occasion constrained by govemment involvement when they tried to push 
through measures ranging from compulsory attendance through unpaid community 
labor. Beating parents to force pupils to attend school was technically illegal. 
Forcing schoolchildren and their families to contribute unpaid labor to roadbuilding 
and gardening could not be insisted upon if the Native Department intervened. 
Jeanes teachers in pursuit of their goals, however, might be able to get away with 
such coercive acts without directly implicating missionaries. 
And missionaries had compelling financial reasons for welcoming the Jeanes 
teachers and portraying them as successes. The program offered missions the 
opportunity of having the government pay salaries to teachers under mission 
patronage who would otherwise probably have left the mission in pursuit of wages 
commensurate with their qualifications. The missions were, by the 1930s, deeply 
concerned with the problem of attrition. Teachers' salaries, never high, actually 
dropped as the Jeanes teacher program grew. Missionaries expressed their desire to 
retain the best and brightest of their pupils. But they also acknowledged that these 
pupils could earn more as clerks, dip supervisors, foremen, or even independent 
14 For a description of one particularly dramatic clean-up and construction party involving 
several Jeanes Teachers, see J. Marsh, circular, Community Work at Mount Silinda, 1-10-30, 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions [henceforth ABC] 15.4 item 15. 
15 Report on Johnson Shumba, for first half of 1935, NAZ S1542/Jl v.1. 
16 Adkins, report on JT Samson Zinoire, Marange Reserve, 10-7-34, NAZ S1542/Jl v.1. 
17 See the Report on Jeanes Teacher Work at All Saints Mission Wrenningham for half year 
ending June 1934, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1, which described an "excellent" Jeanes teacher in a region of 
"especially bad" schools, who "may have been possibly a bit hasty in some of his methods of 
presentation" and should therefore be relocated. 
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builders. Sponsoring prize pupils into the program, however, offered the prospect 
of the administration paying for the missions to retain their top talent, the men and 
women missionaries expected to become leaders. 18 
The program also offered the vision of another monetary benefit: with Jeanes 
teachers working to upgrade the outschools, the mission might to be able to expand 
further with less investment of increasingly scarce mission funds. Mission 
operations were expensive primarily because of the high cost of European skilled 
labor. A white male missionary supervising a school circuit (as required by the 
governent in return for capitation and supervision grants) could earn a salary of 
hundreds of pounds a year. And in addition to salary, he would expect a substantial 
house, a garden, plentiful domestic help, education allowances for his children, a 
pension plan, health insurance, paid transport, and a salaried furlough (sometimes a 
year long, going as far away as the United States.) Missions might be able to 
economize by substituting Africans for Europeans as school supervisors and 
development workers. And some missionaries even admitted that Africans, fluent in 
the local language, and understanding the situations, might actually be more 
effective than European community workers. 
This vision of Jeanes teachers as Christian, African leaders-effective African 
leaders-expanding the influence of civilization and Christianity from the school to 
the community as a whole, was too promising for missionaries to drop, even in the 
face of practical difficulties. Missionaries from Southern Rhodesia did diverge from 
other regions' delegates to a regional Jeanes Teacher Conference and argue the need 
for supervision and an emphasis on practical rather than academic training for 
Jeanes teachers. But they encouraged as many as possible of the local men and 
women working as Jeanes teachers to attend, and give papers in English describing 
their work. Such teachers provided powerful images of Africans as experts, 
authorities, and professionals. And supervisors accepted the implications of this 
model of African leadership.19 
Despite missionary and Native Development Department hopes, however, the 
Jeanes teacher program ran into difficulties. The program produced community 
workers who arrived in areas already affected, sometimes traumatically, by the 
changes of the previous thirty to forty years of European interventions. Experience 
with other government workers and mission activities produced some acute 
skepticism and resentment in the communities the Jeanes teacher were supposed to 
serve. Communities suspected that the program served not just African 
communities, but European power as well. Both European officials and indigenous 
chiefs and messengers explicitly linked the Jeanes Teacher program, like the 
agricultural demonstration initiatives, with Land Apportionment and the forced 
resettlement of large numbers of Africans onto distant, dry, overcrowded lands. 
18 See the CNC's description of meetings in 1932 with various missionaries, including the 
Anglican bishop of Mashonaland. CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 12-4-34 NAZ S1542/S2. 
19 See the Report of the Inter-Territorial "Jeanes" Conference Held in Salisbury, Southern 
Rhodesia on 27 May to 6 June, 1935 (Lovedale, 1936). African delegates did, however, stay at 
Domboshawa, a government school for Africans, rather than in Salisbury, and their talks were far 
more limited in time than those of the white speakers. 
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Development programs allowed government officials to claim that they continued to 
take responsibility for the prosperity and progress of the African population even as 
they passed increasingly restrictive legislation on land, marketing, and cattle.20 
More immediately, however, those who lived in the reserves observed a whole 
series of levies, ranging from dog taxes through dip fees, school taxes, and 
proposed taxes on men who were not employed outside the reserves. In theory, 
these monies were all earnarked for development.21 Those who paid, however, 
saw little immediate result, and were unable to control what forms of development 
the money went to.22 Senior men may also have resented being lectured at by 
young teachers, and by Jeanes teachers and demonstrators. Worse yet, some senior 
men clearly viewed Jeanes teachers and demonstrators as govemment agents, sent 
to sniff out the best land and make new expropriations possible. Paramount Nema 
of the Selukwe Reserve, for example, argued that the govemment was only trying 
to take land and that people needed more land rather than development lessons.23 
Jeanes teachers were also perceived as new, higher-level, mission servants. And in 
areas with substantial tensions between senior men and mission youth, such as 
Gutu, this led directly to confrontations that damaged the teachers' credibility with 
elders and with Native Department officials.24 
Jeanes teachers, therefore, could be troubling for financially stressed 
communities: they represented outside influences in the form of government and 
mission standards and rules, but they made demands on the local population in 
20 Correspondence between the Director of Native Development (Jowitt), the Colonial 
Secretary (Leggate), and H.U. Moffat, NAZ 170/1171/ 1933-4. 
21 As an example of this rhetoric, see the Rhodesian Agricultural Union [RAU] Committee 
Report on "The Growing Shortage of Native Labor," Rhodesia Herald 18-2-27 (filed in NAZ 
S 170/164), which proposed a 30s/year surtax on all men not employed outside the Reserve, to be 
paid into a fund for development. The RAU development tax was merely a proposal and was not 
implemented. Missions, however, did extract development taxes in the form of dip fees, school 
taxes, and farm rents. Any mission designated as a private location (most missions) was able to 
raise taxes at will. And for headmen's responses to the escalating taxes, see NAZ N9/5/3, a record 
of official visits between the administrator and various government recognized chiefs and headmen. 
They complained of dog taxes, constant dipping fees, and the lack of markets for their cattle. 
Foggin, the director of education, claimed in 1921 that the Anglican mission had pioneered school 
rates. Foggin to Administrator, 21-5-21, NAZ S840/1/33. 
22 The Native Boards, headed by the local native commissioner, were in theory responsible 
for local development spending. In practice, they were rarely permitted to make investments that 
would actually benefit people: schools, cooperative shops paying for grain in cash, or subsidized 
bus and transit services. See Leslie Bessant, "Coercive Development: Peasant Economy, Politics, 
and Land in Chiweshe Reserve, Colonial Zimbabwe, 1940-1966 (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 
1987). Bessant focuses on a later time period, but points to a lack of community control extending 
back into the 1930s. 
23 E.D. Alvord (Director of Native Agriculture), "The Development of Native Agriculture in 
Southern Rhodesia" (undated typescript memoir, U.S. Department of Agriculture Library, 
Beltsville, MD), 19. 
24 See the controversy over Hannis Mungazi's role in Gutu, in Carol Summers, "Educational 
Controversies: African Activism and Educational Strategies in Southern Rhodesia, 1920-1934," 
Journal of Southern African Studies 20, 1 (March 1994) 3-25. 
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terms of labor, loyalty, and money. Rather than bringing money and resources into 
rural areas, Jeanes teachers called for self-help. They recruited children and parents 
to labor on schools, roads, gardens, and community layout.25 They created new 
political organizations in the school parent committees, which divided communities 
between those who sent children to school and those who did not. And they called 
for the use of new types of consumer goods that had to be paid for with money, 
ranging from the soap essential to their message of cleanliness to the slates and 
books required by schoolchildren, to the cloth and equipment hat Jeanes women 
called for in lessons on sewing, knitting, and cooking. 
Conflicts over Jeanes teachers made their way into archival sources when they 
involved more than the immediate community. Government-appointed headmen and 
"chiefs" could complain to their Native Department officials, and these officials 
responded. During 1934, two Jeanes teachers, Matthew Magorimbo and Lysias 
Mukahleyi, became sufficiently controversial that the entire program design had to 
be revised. 
Matthew Magorimbo 
Matthew Magorimbo was a Salvation Army Jeanes teacher, assigned to the 
Chiweshe Reserve in the Mazoe district under the supervision of the Salvation 
Army's Major Stoyle. The Salvation Army was one of the most aggressively 
evangelical missions in Southern Rhodesia. In 1929, it employed 120 teachers, 
only 28 percent of whom had passed Standard IV (approximately equivalent o the 
U.S. sixth grade, and the government's proposed minimum standard for teachers) 
or higher. This did gradually improve, so that just over half of the teachers it 
employed in 1931 had at least Standard IV. But at that point the educational 
improvements stalled, despite mission efforts to increase the recruitment and 
retention of higher standard teachers.26 Improvements in teachers' qualifications 
produced tensions in the school communities. According to the NC Mazoe in 1932 
During the recent past, particularly the last two years, the type of kraal 
school teacher has ... altered for the worse from the older responsible type 
of native with moral force and great personality to whom the heathen 
Natives could and did look up to with respect. In his stead appears a very 
young man who, although better educated, has obviously but little 
experience. He certainly commands but little respect from the elders but 
perhaps exerts some influence on the younger people, most particularly the 
girls. At any rate it can safely be said that his manners and actions are not 
25 This preceded the Jeanes teachers. See CNC Report for 1927, p. 5, where he records NCs' 
reports of parental objections to mission teacher or schools' demands for obligatory, unpaid labor 
on teacher or school plots. 
26 See the statistical appendices for the Annual Report of the Director of Native 
Development 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933. The Salvation Army tried to retain teachers by requiring 
students in the upper levels to sign contracts promising to teach for the mission. For evidence of 
the Howard contracts, see Major Furman (SA) to Major Wane (NC), 8-8-34, NAZ S1542/S2. 
Students agreed to teach one year for each year of training, and remit 10/- a month to the Salvation 
Army until training fees were paid in full. If a teacher was dismissed, unpaid fees were to be paid 
immediately, rather than in installments. Fees were ?6 for each year of training. 
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conducive to that good feeling which appears to me so necessary to a 
thorough understanding between the Missionary and the older and more 
influential natives. Whilst admitting that the present system of examination 
is a necessary one, I would submit that educational qualification is not the 
main criterion and that the older fashioned grey headed native teacher was in 
real Christianity and in the uplift of the Native races more successful than 
his more modem and more scholastically educated brother.27 
Faced with these tensions between senior men and younger, educated, Christian 
teachers, the Salvation Army backed its converts against the elders and government, 
increasingly acting in ways the native commissioner perceived as adversarial rather 
than working toward order and cooperative development. 
Under the pressures of the Depression and without increased government 
support for schools, the Army began to move away from the standard local school- 
centered mission toward a more international evangelical model. It applied to open 
schools that would provide only religious training, not even attempting the basic 
school code.28 It worked to stake out territory, even in the face of community 
opposition, to block the expansion of rival missions such as the Wesleyan 
Methodists.29 And it held revivals and night meetings to generate enthusiasm and 
converts, producing more than its share of parental complaints.30 
Even more than some of the more conventional missions, the Salvation Army 
embraced the idea of the Jeanes teachers as a way for Africans to accept some of the 
burden of mission leadership, sparing white missionaries from school 
administration and teaching. Missionaries also saw these programs as ways of 
promoting development based on community, rather than mission, resources. 
Reflecting Salvation Arny concerns about territory, rather than school content and 
quality, Matthew Magorimbo began his Jeanes work not just with school lessons, 
but with public works projects.31 In 1933, he coordinated the construction of roads 
to schools in his area. In 1934, he called up work parties to "terrace" (reinforce) the 
new roads to prevent them from washing away in the rains.32 He also worked to 
establish school gardens for each of the schools under his supervision. In the 
Chiweshe reserve, an area that was becoming increasingly densely settled, he 
marked out school plots ranging from four acres for Kanokamwe School to 8.1 
acres for Gunguwe School. These school plots, most of which were nearly five 
27 Annual Report of the NC Mazoe for 1932, NAZ S235/509. 
28 Assistant NC Goromonzi to NC Salisbury, 13-9-33, NAZ S1542/S2. The schools were 
Mupandawana nd Mashambanaka. The assistant NC recommended authorizing these schools. 
29 See Assistant NC Goromonzi to NC Salisbury, 8-4-35; and Assistant NC Urungwe to 
NC Lomagundi, 19-5-33, NAZ S 1542/S2. 
30 Report of the NC Mazoe for 1929, NAZ S 1561/64. 
31 The NC did accuse Magorimbo of laying stress on the religious and scholastic aspects of 
school life rather than appropriate industrial training. Annual Report of the NC Mazoe for 1933, 
NAZ S235/5 11. The scholastic and religious aspects of Magorimbo's role, however, are not well 
documented. 
32 Report on Jeanes Teacher Magorimbo, 14-8-34, NAZ S1542/J1/v. 1. 
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acres, defied government regulations that a school could occupy no more than a 
two-acre plot with an additional five acres for the teacher. Magorimbo's designation 
of school plots was in addition to the private gardens cultivated by teachers and 
their wives.33 The school gardens were probably ploughed by parents and 
cultivated by student labor, with the proceeds going to the mission.34 Magorimbo 
also reported constructing a new school building of Kimberly brick, an 
improvement over the wattle and daub of the earlier structure, and a building that 
provided a model for community improvement by encouraging the construction of 
Kimberly brick houses for several important men.35 According to a highly critical 
native commissioner, Magorimbo was pushing for people to change "their entire 
way of life."36 
The NC Mazoe was never really in favor of the Jeanes teacher experiment, as 
he worried about alien natives, new ideas, and how to maintain control. When 
Magorimbo first came into the area, the NC complained that he did not understand 
the program and had not been properly notified as it developed. And as for 
Magorimbo himself, 
I am entirely in the dark as to whether he is to be under my control or 
merely a free lance wandering at will and possibly teaching at will any 
subject his fancy dictates.... it is more than likely that the teacher would 
have been arrested by my Native Messengers for removing to this District 
from Charter without my permission, for I have given them strict 
instructions to arrest all Natives of other Districts who are resident in this 
district without my permission.37 
Magorimbo's presence and authority violated the NC's ideas and methods of native 
administration. He went on to imply that Magorimbo was truly dangerous: 
I feel it hardly fair that a Native Commissioner should be held responsible 
for the behavior of the Natives of his district when individuals such as these 
are allowed to wander through Reserves under, as far as I am at the moment 
aware, no control ... certainly not under the control of the official 
responsible for the welfare and good behavior of the Native population.38 
By 1934, Magorimbo's initiatives had led the Jeanes teacher into conflict with 
senior local men and with the Native Department, and produced a clash between the 
Native Department (which backed the senior men) and Native Development 
Department (which sided with Magorimbo and the mission). Two local men, 
33 NC Mazoe to CNC, 6-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1/v.3. The new regulations were spelled out in 
DND to Missionary Superintendents, circ. 1/34, 15-1-34, NAZ Historical Manuscripts, MET 
3/18/1/1, a file that includes the circulars sent by the DND to missionary superintendents. 
34 This was the common pattern until regulations were passed to restrict obligatory unpaid 
labor and specify that the pupils and/or teacher received the produce. 
35 Annual Report of Matthew Magorimbo, as reported by the NC Mazoe to CNC, 1934, 
NAZ S1542/J1/v.3. 
36 NC Mazoe Annual Report for 1934, NAZ S 1563/1934. 
37 NC Mazoe to CNC, 1-2-33, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
38 Ibid. 
This content downloaded from 141.166.177.252 on Mon, 28 Jul 2014 19:36:39 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GIVING ORDERS IN RURAL SOUTHERN RHODESIA 289 
Gweshe and Chirwanemuka, swore out affadavits that Magorimbo had not, indeed, 
constructed the Kimberly brick buildings he claimed to have built. The new school, 
Gweshe claimed, was built by Thomas, a local builder. Magorimbo's only 
involvement was coming and telling Thomas to build it.39 In February 1934, the 
tension became acute when, responding to local complaints about the amount of 
land the schools were fencing, the NC Mazoe wrote a message calling Magorimbo 
into his office for discussions. Magorimbo did not show up on the appointed day, 
nor did the NC receive any excuse.40 Magorimbo's failure to respond to this 
summons provided the NC with a legal rationale for prosecution, and the chief 
native commissioner with a test case on the issue of who had what authority in the 
reserves. 
Both Magorimbo and his mission sponsors viewed Magorimbo's position in 
the Chiweshe reserve as one of authority, not obedience. And while he was 
nominally under the control of Major Stoyle, his local supervisor and the Salvation 
Army's territorial commander, Magorimbo had a substantial measure of 
independence to design his own projects, decide what to do on a day-to-day basis, 
and coordinate other Africans in projects involving semi-forced labor. When 
peremptorily summoned to attend on the NC, Magorimbo waited to consult Major 
Stoyle, who called in his own superior. The superior wrote a sharp letter to the 
CNC, rebuking the local native commissioner for his interference in Jeanes teacher 
and educational activities.41 And when the native commissioner began to order 
teachers to take down fencing around school gardens that had exceeded the two- 
acre limit, at least one teacher responded that he would have to talk to Magorimbo 
first.42 The NC Mazoe, who felt that Magorimbo's powers were diametrically 
opposed to the order necessary for proper native administration, was appalled, as 
were his superiors in the Native Department, and other officials.43 
The correspondence regarding this dispute went up the administrative hierarchy 
all the way to the premier, who held the portfolio of minister for native affairs. The 
most serious issue, the CNC emphasized, was that of control, and "as far as the 
Natives are concerned, Major Stoyle and his Jeanes Teacher have publically flouted 
the authority of the Native Commissioner."44 The CNC attempted to quash 
Magorimbo's missionary defenders by emphasizing to Major Stoyle that "I wish it 
39 Gweshe, Affadavit, 15-2-34, NAZ S1542/J1/v.3. See also Chirwanemuka, Affadavit, 22- 
2-34, same file. 
40 CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, NAZS1542/J1/v.3. 
41 Territorial Commander, Salvation Army, to CNC, 15-3-34, S1542/J1/v/3. 
42 CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, S1542/J1/v.3. 
43 For the NC's reaction, see the NC Mazoe Annual Report for 1934. For the reactions of 
Major Wane's superiors, see CNC [Carbutt] to Minister of Native Affairs, 12-4-34, NAZ 
S 1542/S 1. 
44 CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. Note that the CNC did 
not specify what sort of control he was concerned about. Instead, he evoked a more general (and 
somewhat fantastic) concept of the native commissioner's full knowledge of and authority over all 
happenings in a given territory. 
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to be clearly understood that we cannot tolerate direct interference with the orders of 
a Native Commissioner, which is bound to cause confusion in the Native mind."45 
For the Native Department, the problem was not Magorimbo's actual 
relationship with the local community or the specific programs he put in place. 
Instead, Magorimbo was a problem because of his independence, and his 
independent delivery of orders to local people. Understanding this, the Native 
Department officials did not block Magorimbo's initiatives or prosecute him as an 
individual; they sought a settlement hat would address the pertinent issue of face. 
Stoyle and Magorimbo attended the NC in the NC's office, apologized, and then 
the NC "insisted on informing Magorimbo in his, Major Stoyle's presence, that he 
must in every instance obey my instructions in future and that unless he did so he 
would be prosecuted this no matter what instructions he had received from other 
sources."146 
Lysias Mukahleyi47 
Lysias Mukahleyi's experiences provided another test case for the Jeanes teacher 
initiative. Mukahleyi was a Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) Jeanes teacher who 
trained in the same cohort as Matthew Magorimbo.48 He proved even more 
controversial than Magorimbo. Magorimbo had gotten into trouble by following the 
mission line and working to implement his training. Mukahleyi apparently 
perceived his goals of community development in more political terms. Mukahleyi 
was one of the best-educated Africans affiliated with the Dutch Reformed mission 
in Southern Rhodesia, a mission notorious in the region for its deplorable schools. 
Early inspectors wrote scathing descriptions of schools where 53 out of 97 enrolled 
students who actually attended a rural school shared among them one teacher and 
six slates, where a school of 66 pupils was open for a year without a schoolroom, 
or where a group of 48 children spent three months staring at Chart I, to the point 
where they could recite it by heart, but not read it.49 In 1929, the DRC employed 
425 African teachers, making it one of the most important missions in Southern 
Rhodesia in terms of numbers. But fewer than 10 percent of those teachers had 
passed Standard IV or higher.50 The mission expanded, despite its poor advanced 
education, through its careful use of structure. The DRC was probably the first 
45CNC to Maj. Stoyle, 13-3-34, NAZ S1542/Jl v.2. 
46 NC Mazoe to CNC, 22-3-34, NAZ S1542/Jl v.3. 
47 Lysias' surname is spelled in a variety of different ways in different sources, and in many 
documents he is merely refered to as Lysias. Variant spellings include the following: Mukahlehi; 
Mukartyei; Mukahleyi; Mukartyoyi. Lysias himself employed various spellings in different 
surviving documents. 
48 Both men were in the group of Jeanes teachers given official appointments (on probation) 
on 15-2-33. Secretary to DND, 15-2-33, NAZ S 170/1225. The most senior Jeanes teachers had, by 
this time, completed two years of probation. Colonial Secretary to DND, 15-2-33, NAZ 
S 170/1225. 
49 Lenfestey, Inspection of DRC Mission Morgenster, 9-4-23, NAZ S840/1/37. 
50 Statistical appendices, Director of Native Development Annual Report for 1930. 
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mission to introduce printed schemes of work (in book form) for a three-year 
course prior to Standard I. These schemes were rigid, and DRC education 
notoriously inflexible. But with the schemes, teachers far below the government's 
Standard IV requirement could nevertheless expand and operate schools that at least 
brought children up to the level of education required for baptism.51 Under 
government pressure, the DRC also provided vacation courses designed to bring 
sub-standard teachers up to a level referred to as the "vernacular certificate"- 
professional preparation in teaching with academic work approximately equivalent 
to Standard IV, but without the training in English.52 Nor was the mission's 
disciplinary structure entirely academic. DRC missions employed attendance 
officers who went out around the schools to enforce school attendance, which was 
recorded carefully in the school registers submitted for the government's capitation 
grants in aid.53 DRC missionaries also tried to control their people's lives in ways 
that could be highly intrusive as they levelled fines for "moral offenses," rearranged 
marriages, or called for fees, fines, and tuition and book money in ways that made 
some DRC missionaries personally wealthy.54 
By the early 1930s, under government pressure, the DRC was beginning to 
hire a few better educated teachers, particularly from the American Board schools. 
But it only gradually yielded ground to the Native Department's attempts to restrict 
missionary power. Despite a substantial demand for better schools in areas 
dominated by the DRC, a government investigation into DRC finances and 
usurpation of state power, and the expulsion of one missionary as a bad influence, 
the DRC held on. 
In the early 1930s, conditions in the district changed in response to a new 
government program: that of the agricultural demonstrators. These were men who, 
like the Jeanes teachers, studied at an advanced course at Domboshawa and were 
then sent into rural areas to work for community development. But there the 
similarities ended. The agricultural demonstrators were government employees, 
supervised by the government agriculturist for natives, E.D. Alvord, under the 
direct control of the native commissioners, and the program was funded locally, 
through the Native Reserves Trust fund rather than through external philanthropic 
organizations. Agricultural demonstrators were also supposed to be independent of 
the missions. In the Fort Victoria District, however, they were not. Initially met in 
the Zimutu Reserve with skepticism and hostility, the demonstrators chose to 
demonstrate on the lands of mission schools, rather than following the prescribed 
path of recruiting cooperators from among various people in the community, each 
of whom was to farm an acre according to the demonstrator's directions.55 
51 DND Annual Report for 1929, p. 41. 
52 See Director of Native Development, Annual Reports. 
53 The DRC received a grant of ?7,125 in 1929, making it the largest Protestant recipient of 
government educational money. 
54 See the investigation into the finances of the DRC in Gutu, NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 
28-4-33, NAZ S15421M8, discussed in Summers, "Educational Controversies." 
55 Jowitt to CNC, 11-1-32, NAZ S138/72. Jowitt was reporting Alvord's defense of this 
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Demonstrators' cooperation with the mission led to suspicion and conflict with the 
Native Department as the superintendent of natives of Victoria Circle (SoN Victoria) 
wrote to Alvord that it was "not good policy to allow the Demonstrator to get so 
involved with mission schools. This fact alone would account for his unpopularity 
with the kraal natives," and went on to assert that "No demonstrator will be a 
success without the active support and cooperation of the Native Commissioner."56 
The agricultural demonstrators did not act as a pacifying influence in the 
Victoria region. The SoN Victoria not only complained about their connections to 
mnission schools, he also emphasized that they had poor manners, complaining that 
"I have often been particularly struck with the clownish ill-manners of those I have 
come across. I gather that they are often insolent to their elders and look down on 
those who have not been to school."57 Not only did some demonstrators antagonize 
elders and officials through "insolence" and mission involvement, they also irritated 
their sponsors by becoming politically involved. At least one of the first agricultural 
demonstrators in the Victoria circle was an active member of the Southern Rhodesia 
Bantu Association, a legal organization pushing the advancement of the rights of 
educated Africans.58 Local European settlers, furthermore, apparently deeply 
resented any programs that helped Africans raise and sell maize on the local 
market.59 
Despite these inauspicious beginnings, agricultural demonstrators did rapidly 
build a following in the Zimutu Reserve. By 1932, the agriculturist was referring to 
demonstration work in the region as "very popular."60 Demonstrators acquired this 
popularity by helping local farmers expand their production and sale of maize and 
other cash crops. Evidently they did so by de-emphasizing the crop rotations and 
careful soil conservation provisions of their training and becoming, according to 
their critics, "farm managers for those who grow maize for sale."'61 Alvord, on the 
other hand, emphasized the usefulness of a substantial market for African maize in 
deviation from policy. Alvord argued that initially almost no one was willing to have plots, so 
demonstrators worked on mission plots to keep busy and that this was the only case in Rhodesia 
where the program became so heavily invoved with the schools. Alvord accepted that it was not 
good for agricultural demonstrators to become mission farm managers. 
56 SoN Victoria to Agriculturist, 3-2-30, NAZS138/2 1927-30. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Jowitt (DND) to SoN Victoria, 14-2-30, 1?AZ S 13812. The demonstrator was reproved 
for his political involvement by both Alvord and the SoN Victoria. 
59 See Alvord, "The Development of Native Agriculture." 
60 Alvord, Report on Before Planting Inspection, 1932-3, 24-1-33, NAZ S 138/2. 
61 Assistant NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 9-6-33, NAZ S 138/72. This file contains other 
evidence from around the region that the most popular demonstrators were those who provided 
people with what they wanted-help expanding their maize yields-rather than the soil conservation 
tactics and training in intensive fanning that the government thought they needed. See NC Mtoko 
to CNC, 1-6-33, and NC Zaka to SoN Victoria, 29-4-32. See also Alvord's statement that any 
rotation that did not emphasize maize would be very unpopular (reported by Jowitt to CNC 11-1- 
32) and also his defense against charges that he was suffering from a "maize complex," Alvord to 
DND 8-6-31. 
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the region, especially in Zimutu, where Africans sold maize to European farmers 
and storekeepers who then either used it as cattle feed or resold it for higher 
European prices.62 
After several years of successful demonstration activity, the Native Department 
began to use the demonstrators to coordinate the "centralization" of the Reserves. 
This meant that arable land would be distinguished from grazing land and land 
holdings would be fixed, rather than being subject to change as individuals came 
and went and practiced long-fallow agriculture. Centralization, however, also 
restricted the growth of the most successful market farmers of the region. 
Beginning his work as a Jeanes teacher, Lysias Mukahleyi found himself in the 
midst of controversies over who was in control of the DRC-dominated regions. 
Being paid by the government and working for the DRC in ways that were intended 
to serve the African community, Mukahleyi found himself in the midst of a 
triangular contradiction: the government and DRC mistrusted each other, and both 
mistrusted Africans, who returned the sentiment to varying degrees, sometimes 
choosing to pursue Zionist strategies or explicit political involvement, which 
irritated both government and mission. The Jeanes ideal of nonpolitical cooperative 
development in a Christian framework was probably never a real possibility in such 
a politically muddled region. Mukahleyi apparently did not even try to avoid 
politics. 
Mukahleyi was an early member of the Southern Rhodesia Native 
Association, becoming the secretary of the local branch even as he moved into the 
Victoria circle to begin his work as a Jeanes teacher.63 For conservative Native 
Department officials, this political involvement immediately made him suspect. 
Howman, the superintendent of natives of the Victoria circle, complained at the 
beginning of 1934 that a "Weak streak in [Lysias'] mental capacity ... coupled with 
his political leanings, quite unfits him for any position of independence.... he lacks 
balance."64 
Howman complained of more than just Mukahleyi's personal attitude, 
however. He complained that within the sensitive political atmosphere of the 
Zimutu Reserve, the Jeanes teacher was causing trouble for the community and 
region at large. Howman had been an early opponent of the Jeanes teacher 
program, responding to a query about how the program could serve his region with 
a scathing rejection: 
I do not want the Jeanes Teacher to do anything for me so long as he 
remains outside my control. I do not know what community work means 
exactly but if it consists of pestering the village dwellers to adopt European 
methods of hygiene, sanitation, etc., I do not think it worthy of our 
support. The Jeanes Teacher comes to visit me once a month but I really 
62 Alvord to DND, 8-6-31, NAZ S 138/72. 
63 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
64 Ibid. 
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would prefer that he did not do so as he will only trade on the official 
connection to impose his wiil on the villagers.65 
In this context, Howman objected to Mukahleyi not because of his involvement in 
some protonationalist politics, but because regardless of his specific politics, the 
Jeanes teacher's job was to push change. Mere membership in the SRNA would 
not necessarily have been a problem: Mukahleyi pointed out in his own defense that 
a number of messengers and interpretors in government offices were also members, 
and that the organization was for the benefit of all, rather than being inherently 
hostile to the Native Department.66 Howman repeatedly expressed a desire for 
control and the notion that the Native Department must back its own people, 
whether those people were NCs, chiefs and headmen, or merely agricultural 
demonstrators, rather than supporting the Jeanes teachers who were semi- 
independent and under mission supervision.67 
The situation went from tense to directly confrontational when reports began 
floating into Howman's office from the Zimutu Reserve that Mukahleyi was trying 
"to arrogate powers." Initially these reports were vague. Howman reported an 
absence of complaints from agricultural demonstrators of interference in the 
centralization program and in fact stated that while he would like to ask for 
Mukahleyi's removal, "it will first be necessary to procure some direct evidence of 
wrong-doing."68 Howman's letter indicating his desire to get rid of Mukahleyi and 
his lack of evidence was dated 10 March 1934. The next letter in the file, however, 
with the same date, indicates that Howman had found some evidence, or at least a 
pretext, with which to accuse the Jeanes teacher. After speaking with the 
agricultural demonstrators Howman accused Mukahleyi of 
misleading the natives, disobeying a direct order which I gave him 
personally, and flouting the authority and orders of the Demonstrators who 
are directly responsible for the good order and wellbeing of agricuture in the 
reserve. I definitely instructed him not to interfere in any way with 
agricultural operations in the Reserve or give the natives the impression that 
he was carrying out orders received from me.69 
Lysias Mukahleyi, according to Howman, had told people to violate the 
centralization land use plan by granting permission to plough in the land designated 
for grazing. Later, Howman went on to state that eight groups of men that he had 
seen had stated that Mukahleyi had given them permission to plough.70 
65 SoN Victoria (Howman) to CNC, 6-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
66 Lysias Mukahleyi to DND, 16-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
67 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34; Alvord to CNC, 24-2-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
68 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. Howman admitted that he had 
"received no complaints from the Demonstrators in regard to Lysias interfering with their work, 
neither have I had any reports from them that the Natives are ploughing land reserved for grazing. 
69 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
70 SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
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Howman's acute hostility makes this case somewhat difficult to sort out. But 
there are several odd features of this file. First, unlike the files compiled on most 
complaints, especially with regard to mission malpractice, or teachers' malfeasance, 
there is a notable lack of affadavits sworn out by witnesses and an equally notable 
lack of specific names given as references. Howman implied that he was 
responding to local complaints but his early letters indicated a desire for any pretext 
on which to expell Mukahleyi. Once he had his pretext, Howman acted bluntly, 
with all the power his position gave him: he sent Mukahleyi, in the custody of a 
messenger, to go about in the communities where he had worked, and ordered the 
Jeanes teacher to publically proclaim himself "an untrustworthy person." 
Acknowledging that this would destroy Mukahleyi's ability to do his job, Howman 
went on to ask for his removal.71 
Mukahleyi tried to defend himself and mobilize potential support not merely 
among the SRNA (which might have been counterproductive as it would emphasize 
his political connections) but from his mission supervisors and the Department of 
Native Development. He pointed out in the official record that the SRNA was a 
legitimate organization, with many government-employed members. And he flatly 
denied Howman's most serious charge, that he had "interfered in any way with the 
administration of the Reserve...."72 Howman made the charge of interference 
explicit by pointing to several violations: Mukahleyi, he said, had allotted land for 
trees and school gardens; persuaded children to weed his own garden; and 
"constantly organizes meetings" to discuss the work of headmen and the division of 
land by the headmen and chiefs.73 
These charges, however, are notable for how easily they can be explained 
within the prescribed work routine of the Jeanes teacher. Jeanes teachers were 
supposed to encourage the planting of trees and school gardens. Persuading 
children to weed was also well within their duties, especially, as Mukahleyi's diary 
indicated, when the weeding was not on private land but on demonstration plots for 
community benefit. And calling meetings of parents and community members to 
discuss how the community could improve itself was essential to improving 
schools and providing the workforce necessary for larger community projects 
involving hygiene, roads, or anything else. Mukahleyi himself complained that 
Howman and others apparently misunderstood his attempts to create parents' 
groups for school improvement and community discussions of development. 
Mukahleyi described some of the meetings in his diary as being to encourage 
obedience to chiefs and headmen.74 Apparently some of the discussions at 
Mukahleyi's meetings got fairly heated. Mukahleyi himself, however, was 
71 SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
72 SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Mukahlehi Diary, NAZ S 1542/J1 v.2. This heavily underlined document in English does 
not provide the evidence Howman asserted it did. All Jeanes teachers were required to keep 
professional diaries of how they spent their time, and submit these regularly to their mission 
supervisors. 
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apparently more important as a facilitator who provided community members with a 
venue to express their disagreements than as an agitator who told them that they 
should feel dissatisfied.75 
Howman's efforts to get rid of Mukahleyi did not work smoothly. Mukahleyi 
not only defended himself in petitions to the Native Development Department, he 
also mobilized supporters among his employers. His missionary supervisor tried to 
retain his services by appealing over the native commissioner's head to the chief 
native commissioner that "Lysias has had a good training and is undoubtedly 
intelligent and progressive ... [concerning] the education and uplift of his own 
people. This may have made him too self-confident to the Natives in the 
Reserves...." But this moderate admission of problems was as far as Reverend 
Louw was prepared to go. He went on to critique the Native Department's handling 
of the situation, at least implicitly, by arguing that a minor incident had been blown 
out of proportion by agricultural demonstrators who were from different missions 
and regions and by authorities who had acted without seeking reconciliation. 
"Lysias has ... always been most submissive," and would have listened if the 
authorities had asked rather than ordering him about.76 Jowitt, the director of native 
development, also intervened with the CNC, complaining that "it is difficult for me, 
without clearer evidence, to appreciate that the actions of the Jeanes Teacher 
warranted instant dismissal without reference to those primarily concerned."77 
Both Louw and Jowitt, like Major Stoyle in the Magorimbo case, were 
attempting to defend a notion of the chain of command that ran from the Native 
Development Department through the missions to the Jeanes teachers and finally the 
community. The Department's opposition to any loss of the native commissioner's 
authority in the reserves was clear from both Major Wane's response as NC Mazoe 
and Howman's response as superintendent of natives of Victoria. The head of the 
Native Department, Colonel Carbutt, stated the supremacy of his department 
forcibly when he argued to Rev. Louw that the Department had to act immediately 
and was unable to inform the mission in advance because "I cannot foresee when 
any person is going to misbehave."78 
The most serious issue, however, was not that of consultations, but of whether 
Africans, even educated and prepared as Jeanes teachers were, could be allowed to 
wield actual authority, or whether they must remain as supervised underlings. On 
this, the Native Development Department and the mission sought to portray 
Mukahleyi as an actor, an educated, responsible human being who should be 
granted some autonomy. But the CNC argued that Africans' autonomy was 
inherently suspect: 
75 He repeatedly asserted that while many people had spoken at the meetings, and all sorts of 
comments were made, that he had only encouraged obedience and had done nothing that could be 
construed as obstructing the demonstrators' program. Lysias Mukahleyi to DND, 16-4-34, NAZ 
S1542/JI v.2. 
76 Rev. Loew to CNC, 11-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
77 DND to CNC 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
78 CNC to Rev. Louw, 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1 v.2. 
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the system under which the Jeanes Teachers work will always be fraught 
with the danger of their exceeding their legitimate functions, because 
experience has shown that Natives, when clothied with any sort of authority, 
nearly always abuse it, unless they are kept under the closest supervision, 
which is not possible in the case of a Jeanes Teacher.79 
CNC Carbutt stated that he was willing to allow Mukahleyi to continue to work 
only under direct supervision at a mission station. 
Yet by the beginning of the 1935 school year, even that compromise was 
falling apart. Rev. Louw proposed to move Mukahleyi back to the Zimutu Reserve 
to work directly under Rev. Moller's supervision. But both the CNC and DND 
concluded that such a move would be unwise as it would put Lysias directly back 
into the midst of a battle over centralization and the authority of agricultural 
demonstrators.80 And Lysias himself acknowledged the difficulties of his position 
when he noted that he did not like and probably could not work with Reverend 
Moller and that key native messengers, especially the head messenger, Mahachi, 
were planning to get him expelled from Zimutu if he went back.81 
Bureaucratic Squabbles 
Magorimbo and Mukahleyi provided sharp examples of cases where the Jeanes 
teacher program became controversial. Both cases ended in ceremonial gestures to 
the Native Department. Magorimbo was forced to make a formal apology to the 
native commissioner. Mukahleyi was put under direct mission supervision after 
being forced to declare himself an untrustworthy person. Neither man had a long 
career in the program, though both survived initial attempts to oust them and 
Magorimbo, at least, went on to a successful career as one of the first African 
school supervisors.82 But neither Magorimbo nor Mukahleyi, nor any of the other 
Jeanes teachers who confronted local powers, was immediately and permanently 
dismissed for disrespect to white or black Native Department authorities or to 
traditional authorities. Individual Jeanes teachers held their jobs amidst accusations 
of forcing labor, illegally mediating disputes, and reallocating land. 
Individual Jeanes teachers survived episodes of Native Department opposition 
not through community support, or even mission support, but due to intensive 
interdepartmental conflict between the Native Department and the Native 
Development Department. The wars were fought in minor battles over Jeanes 
teachers such as Magorimbo and Mukahleyi, over teachers who had not paid taxes 
or appeared to a NC as too young to teach and over depictions of teachers and 
schools in annual departmental reports. The friction between the two departments 
79 Ibid. 
80 C.R. deC. Peele for DND to Rev A. Louw, 24-1-35, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1. 
81 Lysias Mukartyoyi to CNC, 10-3-35, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1. 
82 Magorimbo became a supervisor for the American Methodist Episcopal mission. H.I. 
James, Report for Mrewa, Official Journal of the Rhodesia Annual Conference of the Methodist 
Church, 1938. 
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may have been partially due to personal animosity between two rival strong-willed 
heads of department, Col. Carbutt and Harold Jowitt. But it was also institutional, 
sparked by the two departments' fundamentally different notions of how authority 
should be constructed in the African communities of Southern Rhodesia. 
The Native Department cultivated and defended a concept of authority in which 
communities were headed by "traditional" elders, headmen and chiefs, who were, if 
suitable, granted official recognition by the Department and kept in line through a 
steady diet of ceremonial gestures ranging from salaries through native board 
meetings and official visits. On a daily basis, the native commissioner would 
coordinate the population by using his native messengers as go-betweens to deliver 
his directives to the "traditional eadership." The Native Department pushed 
legislation that made the native commissioner of the 1930s effectively supreme 
within his territory: the Native Affairs Act mandated that all Africans must obey his 
reasonable requests. Above the native commnissioner was the regional 
superintendent of natives, the chief native commissioner, and then the 
nonprofessionals: the governmental ministers and their staffs. Native 
commissioners appear to have seen this structuring of power and authority as 
effective and strong, but also somewhat brittle. They feared damage to any one of 
the system's key points, whether that be the prestige of the elders, the menace of 
the messengers, or the independent superiority of the nnative commissioner. The 
structure was not designed to bend and move. It had no place for ambitious young 
men who sought to gain power through their achievements or expertise as teachers, 
skilled craftsmen, prosperous farmers, or mission employees. 
The Native Development Department, on the other hand, was built around a 
goal of change. It promoted a concept of development and progress rather than 
Native Department ideals of order, and sought to reconfigure notions of authority 
within communities from a static value determined by age and inherited position, to 
authority as a function of schooling, skill, way of life, and achievement. Order and 
good administration were not the highest values of the Native Development 
Department. Instead, the Department valued its own concepts of progress and 
improved quality of life. 
Participation and Development 
The program's problems, however, were not merely at the level of 
interdepartmental bureaucratic competition: they involved the very notion of 
authority in rural Zimbabwe. In its ideal form, the Jeanes teacher program was 
supposed to be highly voluntary as parents and community members observed, 
decided what they wanted, and then developed their community's resources and 
institutions. This model of consensus-based voluntary development, however, did 
not fit the realities of reserve communities. Within the increasingly controlled and 
segregated context of Southern Rhodesia, authority and economic well-being in the 
reserves did not come from popular cooperation and consensus but through 
preferential access to outside patrons and connections. The idyllic assumption that 
rural communities would automatically work together to promote better lives was 
quite simply fantastic within a context where individuals and families increasingly 
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competed for land, access to markets, jobs, building contracts, labor, and 
government positions. 
Jeanes teachers, and indeed the other demonstration programs as well, were 
based on the idea that rural communities merely needed to see what was possible 
and they would voluntarily sacrifice and work to achieve better lives and 
conditions. But the principal demonstration that younger, educated men observed 
was that of Europeans' accumulation of goods and ostentatious display of status. 
When the idea of teaching by demonstration and voluntary emulation failed, 
therefore, the Jeanes teachers and demonstrators followed the model of authority 
that dominated the region's culture, society, and economy: they claimed authority 
based on position and connections, and gave orders, regardless of whether they 
actually had the legal authority to do so. Though the program had been initiated as a 
cooperative, voluntary, development initiative, it rapidly became an early exercise in 
what Leslie Bessant calls "coercive development," relying on orders and force 
rather than education and collective interests.83 
Community development programs in Southern Rhodesia suffered because 
they were based on an ideal of community that failed to fit the realities of Rhodesia. 
Community efforts to mobilize, efforts that involved both senior men and younger 
men and women, had been repeatedly blocked by mission and government efforts 
to reinterpret demands and actions. When senior men called for better schools and 
offered to pay for them-as Ziki and his people on the Devuli Ranch, who worked 
for American Board schools-government underfunding and the depression of the 
economy through maize control, destocking, and restrictions on cattle sales 
thwarted their aims. When younger and older men mobilized through the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers' Union to petition for useful education in the Umchingwe 
block of Insiza District, government reinterpretations of their wants led to the 
imposition of a project that failed to meet their goals.84 
The Jeanes teacher initiative was designed to encourage communities to 
develop suitable goals and then provide them with nonpolitical, nonthreatening 
ways of pursuing these goals. In a politicized environmemnt, however, where 
goals could only be achieved by demanding more or taking from one group to give 
to another, the Jeanes teachers' close ties to the administration and missions 
hampered their ability to build coalitions with local parents and community leaders. 
And teachers' mobilization of communities to discuss political problems created 
suspiscion in administrative officials, ranging from the chief native commissioner to 
the staff of messengers who coordinated the information flow into local native 
commissioners' offices. Caught between the various interests they were intended to 
serve, Jeanes teachers resorted to orders and force to produce results, increasing 
antagonisms in the process, antagonisms that further broke apart the communities 
they were supposed to coordinate and build. 
83 Bessant, "Coercive Development." 
84 Carol Summers, "Walking Alone in Front?: Teachers in the Rural Schools of Colonial 
Zimbabwe" (unpublished paper, 1995) and "Demanding Schools: The Umchingwe Project and 
African Men's Struggles for Education in Southern Rhodesia 1928-34" African Studies Review 
40, 2 (1997), 117-39. 
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The most successful Jeanes teachers proved to be among the least ambitious. 
The female Jeanes teachers who provided classes, one-on-one medical help, 
voluntary information, and hygiene advice proved little threat and provoked little 
controversy. The male Jeanes teachers who focused on the mission schools and 
functioned strictly as teacher supervisors, rather than large-scale development 
workers, survived to be promoted into African superintendents when the Jeanes 
teacher program was phased out in favor of more specialized education and 
development workers. This sharply delimited pattern of success, however, raised 
questions about the program's central ogic. The Native Development Departnent 
and the missions failed to develop and sustain a program capable of allowing 
cooperative, voluntary rural development o produce changes in the power structure 
and ways of life of rural Africans. Rather than bringing Africans together or taking 
advantage of any common interests they might have, development programs such 
as the Jeanes teacher program split them into groups battling with each other for 
control of time, labor, resources, and authority. Ultimately, the programs promoted 
faction and dispute about obligations and the distribution of existing resources, 
rather than providing mechanisms through which communities could bootstrap 
themselves to comfort and affluence. And even the program's controversies 
revolved around the question of power and who had the authority to give orders, 
rather than around any question of what would benefit the most people or create 
new communal institutions for development. 
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